Motivated by peer-to-peer (P2P) networks and content delivery applications, we study Capacitated Selfish Replication (CSR) games, which involve nodes on a network making strategic choices regarding the content to replicate in their caches. Selfish replication games were introduced in [6], who analyzed the uncapacitated case leaving the capacitated version as an open direction.
connected networks with two objects and binary object preferences can be solved in polynomial time via a reduction to the well-studied evencycle problem.
Introduction
Consider a P2P movie sharing service where you need to decide which movies to store locally, given your limited disk space, and which to obtain from your friends. Note that your decisions affect those of your friends, who in turn take actions that affect you. A natural question arises: what is the prognosis for you and your network of friends in terms of the stability of your movie collections and the satisfaction you will derive from them? Similarly, in the brave new wireless world of 4G you will not only be a consumer of different apps, you (your personal communications and computing device) will also be a provider of apps to others around you. And the question arises: could this lead to a situation of endless churn (in terms of what apps to store) or could there be an equilibrium?
In this paper, we study Capacitated Selfish Replication (CSR) Games, which provide an abstraction of the above scenarios. These are games in which the strategic agents, or players, are nodes in a network. The nodes have object preferences as well as bounded storage space -caches -in which they can store copies of the content. Each node cooperates with other nodes by serving their requests to access objects stored in its cache. However, the set of objects that a node chooses to store in its cache is entirely based on its own utility function and where objects of interest have been stored in the network.
Such a game-theoretic framework was first introduced in [6], which analyzed pure Nash equilibria in a setting with storage costs but no cache capacities, and left the capacitated version as an open research direction. Recent work on CSR games has focused on hierarchical networks, which are extensively used to model the communication costs of content delivery and P2P systems. (For instance, see [14] that uses the ultrametric model for content delivery networks and the work of of [20, 15, 16, 26] on cooperative caching in hierarchical networks.) The best result from previous work on CSR games for hierarchical networks [19, 23] is the existence of a Nash equilibrium for (a slight generalization of) a one-level hierarchical network using the sum utility function, i.e., when the utility of each node is based on a weighted sum of the cost of accessing the objects.
Our Results
This paper studies the existence and computability of Nash equilibria for several variants of CSR games, with a particular focus on hierarchical networks. As with earlier studies [6, 19, 23, 1] , we focus on the case where all pieces of content have the same size; note that otherwise even computing the best response of a player (node) is a generalization of the well-known knapsack problem and is NP-hard.
-Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium for CSR games in any hierarchical network, thus resolving the question
